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Abstract - Analysis of cyber relevant data has become an area of 
increasing focus. As larger percentages of businesses and 
governments begin to understand the implications of cyberattacks, 
the impetus for better cybersecurity solutions has increased. 
Unfortunately, current cybersecurity datasets either offer no ground 
truth or do so with anonymized data. The former leads to a quandary 
when verifying results and the latter can remove valuable 
information. Additionally, most existing datasets are large enough 
to make them unwieldy during prototype development. In this paper 
we have developed the PicoDomain dataset, a compact high-fidelity 
collection of Zeek logs from a realistic intrusion using relevant 
Tools, Techniques, and Procedures. While simulated on a small-
scale network, this dataset consists of traffic typical of an enterprise 
network, which can be utilized for rapid validation and iterative 
development of analytics platforms. We have validated this dataset 
using traditional statistical analysis and off-the-shelf Machine 
Learning techniques. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity is a burgeoning field of research. Coupled 
with recent advances in Machine Learning (ML), a scenario 
where cyber defenses are bolstered by semi-autonomous 
systems [1] is beginning to become a reality. In this scenario, 
platforms trained on the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs), and goals of adversaries would be able to detect the 
abstracted behaviors of an intruder and react, even when the 
intruder was using legitimate access methods and 
masquerading near perfectly as a normal user. This future will 
require training these platforms on large volumes of cyber 
relevant data with known ground truth. As a result, this 
presents a challenge with currently available datasets. Large 
datasets are often required to train effective ML based 
detectors, but the amount of time and resources it would take 
to rapidly iterate an analytic over these large datasets is 
prohibitive. Additionally, currently available large datasets 
either offer no ground truth (i.e. ISP level Netflow) or offer 
ground truth but are heavily anonymized (i.e. LANL 2015) 
[2]. The former leads to a quandary when verifying results and 
the latter can remove valuable information from the raw data. 
In this work, we believe there is a critical need for a 
tailored dataset that contains representative traffic from the 
modern enterprise environment, documented ground truth, 
and is small enough to use in the iterative development of 
analytics. To this end, we have developed the PicoDomain 
dataset, which is comprised of Zeek [3] and adversary activity 
logs over a three day campaign utilizing relevant TTPs that a 
modern attacker would employ against a target. The campaign 
follows the Mandiant Attack Lifecycle (MAL) [4] from an 
initial compromise through the execution of mission goals. To 
demonstrate the benefit of this dataset, we evaluated both 
statistical analysis and mature ML techniques for the 
identification of the adversary activity and showed that it is 
well suited for a variety of cybersecurity analysis applications. 
The dataset is hosted at 
https://github.com/iHeartGraph/PicoDomain  
This rest of the paper is organized as follows: It starts with 
the background in Section II and motivation behind the 
construction of the dataset in Section III, moves into the 
environment in Section IV and the adversary actions in 
Section V, discusses the data collection techniques in section 
VI,  and then concludes with empirical observations in Section 
VII and proposed future work in Section VIII.   
II. BACKGROUND 
Several outstanding projects already exist to provide 
cybersecurity data to researchers; however, when assessing 
them to evaluate ongoing ML research they all had a drawback 
that limited their usefulness for unsupervised ML approaches. 
In the following, we will discuss several representative 
projects. Note that we do not intend to denigrate these 
resources, most were created without this use in mind and 
perform exceptionally well for their intended purposes which 
is often to either train a human analysis or to train a signature, 
heuristic, or ML based detector that detects a singular TTP.  
MITRE Caldera [5] is an automated adversary emulation 
system, built on the MITRE ATT&CK framework. This 
platform produces highly detailed artifacts of adversary 
behavior on systems. It does this using a pre-installed agent 
that communicates to a Command & Control (C2) server. 
Although the actual adversarial artifacts are high fidelity, the 
adjacency to the agent in an execution timeline and the agent 
C2 traffic degrade the usefulness of produced logs for 
generalized ML training. On the other hand, Atomic Red 
Team [6] allows every security team to test their controls by 
executing simple "atomic tests" that exercise the same 
techniques used by adversaries (all mapped to MITRE's 
ATT&CK framework). Atomic Red Team predates Caldera 
and is one of the principle frameworks referenced in its 
creation. Atomic Red Team works for small “atomic tests” but 
is ill suited for testing a platform to sniff out all phases of the 
kill chain in a dynamic environment.  
The LANL Comprehensive Multi-Source Cyber-Security 
Events Dataset [2] is a comprehensive and diverse dataset 
from a large production enterprise network with labeled red 
team data. It presents 1,648,275,307 events in total for 12,425 
users, 17,684 computers, and 62,974 processes. Due to the 
production nature of the network, this data is heavily 
anonymized which leads to the loss of some fidelity. For 
example, authentication is distilled to the following record:  
1,C625$@DOM1,U147@DOM1,C625,C625,Negoti
ate,Batch,LogOn,Success. 
This is likely a sanitized Kerberos authentication log 
entry. If this was collected from the unencrypted Kerberos 
network traffic we are missing the renewability and 
forwardability of the Kerberos ticket that was issued; 
however, if this was collected from the domain controller we 
are missing the event ID as well as the Logon type, two pieces 
of information that a routinely used by cyber defenders and 
forensic analysts to determine the source of a cyber incursion 
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[7]. It is worthy to note that LANL also published a dataset in 
2017 called the “Unified Host and Network Dataset” [8] 
which included a much higher level of detail, but did not 
include any labeled red team activity. 
Mordor [9] is another open source project that provides 
pre-recorded security events generated by simulated 
adversarial techniques. This data and project is outstanding. 
The main constraint is scale. Most of the artifacts are for 
small host-based actions, the only dataset of large enough 
scale to test with has only two hosts in the environment. This 
is adequate for most heuristic or signature based testing, but 
does not provide enough data for many ML based 
approaches. In addition, LARIAT [10] is a MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory tool that was initially designed in 2001 as a traffic 
generator and is used today in several large-scale cyber 
ranges. It was used to test detection techniques of that era. It 
has grown from that initial project to possess a suite of 
capabilities for user and network traffic generation. However, 
like previously mentioned platforms, it leaves artifacts 
associated with the framework in both the network as well as 
the host logs that convolute its use for ML tasks.  
III. MOTIVATION FOR PICODOMAIN DESIGN  
In this work, we believe that the environment in which to 
generate the cybersecurity research dataset needed to be 
diverse enough to provide both the services an average user 
would use and be realistic enough to contain the systems and 
platforms that are leveraged by modern attackers. 
Researching cybersecurity trend data from the past decade 
revealed that Microsoft Windows environments are 
decisively the target of attackers worldwide.  
At the time of this writing, Windows binaries are 
submitted to Virus Total, an Alphabet run cloud malware 
scanning service, a staggering 49.6 time more often than 
Linux ELF binaries [11]. This is despite a recent survey of 
hackers worldwide that concluded traditional antivirus (AV) 
security is irrelevant or obsolete [12]. When specifically 
asked why AV was obsolete, the respondents stated, “humans 
are the most responsible for security breaches.” This is not 
surprising. Users must be provided a level of privilege within 
their environment to accomplish business tasks, this often 
includes the use of several network resources (Network 
Share, SharePoint, Email, Windows Active Directory, etc.) as 
well as specialized software like the Microsoft Office Suite, 
Adobe Acrobat, and any industry specific tools. This basic 
level of privilege is often the only level of privilege an 
attacker needs to gain a foothold within a network. 
At the same time, a client-side attack happens when a user 
is leveraged to download and execute a piece of malware. 
Such attacks often involve the trojanization of routine and 
mundane file types, such as Word documents, PDFs, or 
archives. They are delivered to the victim with a convincing 
story or realistic guise that tricks these users into running 
these files. Since these files are legitimate types containing 
only the smallest necessary amount of malicious code, they 
often bypass traditional AV detection and prevention 
methods. Additionally, they either leverage legitimate 
features of software to gain code execution or possess an 
exploit for installed software that achieves the same effect.  
In summary, one can see that attackers consider Microsoft 
Windows as the preferred target and client-side attacks as the 
primary method. In other words, the most representative 
attack would be one against a corporation running a 
Windows environment and the initial foothold attained 
via a client-side attack. Therefore, in this paper, this is the 
scenario used in order to construct the PicoDomain 
environment in which that data is collected.  
IV. PICODOMAIN SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT 
The PicoDomain simulated environment consisted of a 
small Windows-based office environment with five 
workstations, a domain controller, and a gateway 
firewall/router. This enterprise was connected to a small-
scale internet that housed several websites as well as the 
adversary’s infrastructure. 
A. Enterprise Network 
The internal network consisted of a Windows Active 
Directory (AD) environment for the local domain of G.lab. 
G.lab consisted of three primary Organizational Units (OUs): 
HR (human resources department), R&D (research and 
development department), and then a supersecret OU.  
• OUs are hierarchical entities that allow the 
segmentation of policies and privileges within 
Active Directory environments. These policies and 
procedures can apply to both users as well as 
machines. In the .lab domain the OUs had the 
following functions: 
• HR: Limit HR users’ access to only the HR OU’s 
computers and resources 
• R&D: Permit R&D users to research and conduct 
experiments without excessive permissions 
• Supersecret: Greatly restrict access to a single 
resource 
 The G.lab network consisted of a single 10.99.99.0/24 
network with the domain controller (10.99.99.5) handling 
DHCP as well as hostname resolution within the network. Due 
to the DHCP configuration of the network, machine-to-user 
mappings are best done with hostnames and not IPs. This is a 
common challenge in DHCP environments, and this dataset is 
no exception. At the beginning of the scenario the following 
mapping existed: 
Table 1: Initial User Mapping 
Hostname IP Primary User 
RND-WIN10-2  10.99.99.27 RMOLE 
RND-WIN10-1  10.99.99.29 JSNAKE 
HR-WIN7-2  10.99.99.30 BDUCK 
HR-WIN7-1  10.99.99.152 JDOE 
SUPERSECRETXP  10.99.99.160 SQUIRREL 
CORP-DC  10.99.99.5 AMINISTRATOR 
PFSENSE  10.99.99.100 ROOT 
Routing was handled by a PFSense firewall with an 
internal IP of 10.99.99.100. This firewall was not joined to 
the G.lab domain but did manage DNS for the G.lab domain 
for inbound requests and was the DNS server for all outbound 
requests. A diagram of this network can be seen in Figure 1. 
B. Internet 
The internet consisted of the .inet top level domain 
(TLD). Within this TLD there are six websites: vacation.inet, 
books.inet, steak.inet, icecream.inet, falcon.inet, design.inet. 
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Each hosted a modern webpage designed around a single 
topic. These webservers were Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS Linux 
severs running Apache2 with self-signed certificates. Servers 
were divided among 3 subnets. 
Internet traffic was routed by a single router having an 
interface in each of the 3 different /24 subnets where the 
simulated internet existed. The router was a PFSense 2.4.3 
Virtual Machine (VM).  
 
Figure 1: Network Diagram 
C. User Emulation 
User emulation is often the most challenging portion of 
any simulation. Any simulated environment should have 
users that act as real as possible, but this either requires 
automation or heavy manual interaction. Automation 
techniques install scripts or agents that leave unwanted traces 
in collected log data whether from local events that they 
initiate or from network traffic of the agent interacting with a 
C2 server. Due to the intended use of the dataset, a hybrid 
approach was used.  
In this work, two scripts were deployed on the endpoints 
and manual logins via the hypervisor were conducted to 
generate logon, logoff, and restart actions. Specifically, the 
scripts that were deployed emulated web browsing and SMB 
file sharing. These actions were selected as they provide 
critical services for any small network environment but can 
also be leveraged by attackers.  
D. Adversary 
The adversary consisted of a 2019.1 Kali Linux machine 
running PowerShell Empire and pivoting traffic via a reverse 
proxy emulating domain fronting. The domain fronted host 
was icecream.inet with an IP of 3.3.3.5. The actual Kali Linux 
machine had an IP of 1.1.1.11. 
Domain Fronting is the process of leveraging cloud 
infrastructure routing mechanisms to obfuscate the actual 
destination of encrypted traffic. In this scenario, the use of a 
reverse proxy on a webserver mimics this functionality. This 
was done via the apache2 mod_rewrite module. If a specific 
collection of header fields were present in a GET request, the 
traffic was forwarded to the C2 server; else, the normal 
website was returned. This process has the benefit of all TLS 
beginning and ending on the “legitimate” server. The web 
server decrypts and sends the C2 traffic in plain text to the 
actual C2 server. 
V. ADVERSARY CAMPAIGN 
The adversarial campaign was based heavily off the 
conclusions reached in Section III above, that an attacker 
would most likely leverage a client-side attack against an 
average user to gain the initial foothold. It was crucial to stay 
within the bounds of this assumption throughout the 
campaign; however, this assumption did not provide any 
significant guidance for subsequent phases of the attack 
lifecycle.  
The Mandiant Attack Lifecycle (MAL) [4] was used as 
the framework upon which to map the adversarial campaign 
plan. This framework provided the most emphasis on the 
cyclic nature of key phases of any adversarial campaign. 
This, in turn, allowed it to be readily matched to forensic 
artifacts in a chronological manner. The initial phases of the 
MAL are: Initial Reconnaissance, Initial Compromise, and 
Establish Foothold. Following this is the cyclic phase of the 
MAL that is executed as many times as needed prior to 
reaching an attacker’s objective. Within the cyclic phase are 
four sub-phases: Escalate Privileges, Internal 
Reconnaissance, Move Laterally, and Maintain Presence. 
Finally, the MAL concludes with the adversary completing 
the mission. In the following paragraphs we detail how the 
adversary progressed through these phases within 
PicoDomain. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the 
domain compromise. 
  
 
Figure 2: Attack Diagram 
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A. Initial Compromise 
The initial payload was a dropper via the WinRAR 
arbitrary file creation (CVE-2018-20250) vulnerability. In 
this project, the payload was hosted in the guise of an archive 
for a discount code for a membership service. When 
extracted, this archive placed a binary in the Startup folder of 
the current user that executed the next time the user logged 
in. This binary was a precompiled winexec [13] payload that 
downloaded and executed the malware to establish the initial 
foothold in the network. 
B. Establish Foothold 
The malware used to establish the foothold was a semi-
custom, three stage design built entirely in PowerShell. The 
first stage of this malware disabled certificate checking for 
the downloading of scripts and then downloaded and 
executed the 2nd stage. By default, PowerShell will not 
download scripts over HTTPS from sources with self-signed 
certificates [14]. This script looks innocuous and will not flag 
on any known signatures. The second stage is an Anti-
Malware Scanning Interface (AMSI) bypass based on the 
rasta-mouse AMSI buffer bypass [15]. This script patches the 
AMSI process in memory resulting in the AMSI process no 
longer scanning running scripts. This stage then calls the final 
stage which is an obfuscated PowerShell Empire launcher. 
The final stage is obfuscated with Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-
Obfuscation script [16].  
C. Escalate Privileges 
Once the foothold on the initial target machine (patient 0) 
was established, exploitation turned to privilege escalation. 
Research by Google’s Project Zero in 2014 [17] and 
Foxglove Security in 2016 [18] detailed a new kind of attack 
that is not easily mitigated due to backwards compatibility. 
The attack, dubbed “Hot Potato”, combines a New 
Technology LAN Manager (NTLM) relay with NetBIOS 
Name Service (NBNS) spoofing to execute a command as NT 
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, the Windows’ equivalent of root. 
It does this by spoofing the Web Proxy Auto-Discovery 
(WPAD) IP to 127.0.0.1 and then requesting NTLM 
authentication to this local server that is adversary controlled.  
With command execution as SYSTEM, the compromised 
user account was made a local administrator. During the next 
reboot of the system the WinRAR launcher created a new 
agent with system privileges. Next, credentials were 
harvested with a PowerShell implementation of Mimikatz. 
D. Maintain Presence (Persistence) 
Persistence was attained through three methods. The first 
was a second-order effect of the WinRAR exploit. This 
already deposited an executable in the startup folder of the 
victim user thus granting persistence that was triggered every 
time the user logged in. This was only used on the patient 
zero. 
The second form of persistence was via registry keys. 
Windows relies on registry keys to hold critical pieces of 
information about the operating system, hardware, and 
software. One part of the registry controls the applications 
that are run at startup. In this scenario, a PowerShell Launcher 
batch script was hidden in the 
HKCU:SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\R
un registry key which spawned an agent upon the login of the 
current user, similar to how the WinRAR based launcher 
functioned. This technique is typically easy to detect and 
remediate. 
The primary method for persistence was done via WMI 
event subscriptions. WMI event subscriptions trigger when a 
series of statements evaluate to true. They are more difficult 
to find than traditional scheduled task or registry persistence, 
but increased awareness in the past 4 years has decreased 
their viability against hardened networks. In this scenario the 
PowerShell Empire launcher was hidden as a base64 encoded 
string in the filter “Destination” field. This form of 
persistence can only be executed with administrative rights.  
E. Lateral movement 
Lateral movement was conducted via WMI and DCOM 
remote process creation. The DCOM was a PowerShell 
implementation by Steve Borosh of Matt Nelson’s initial 
technique [19]. The WMI technique was either done via the 
PowerShell Empire module or via the windows wmic.exe 
[20]. 
F. Complete Mission 
Throughout the campaign, credentials were periodically 
harvested from each machine, this permitted an administrator 
account to be compromised when they logged onto a 
compromise machine. With these credentials an agent was 
deployed on the domain controller and RDP was enabled. At 
that time, a meterpreter [21] agent was deployed on a target 
that was softened by a PowerShell empire agent running as 
the local administrator. This meterpreter session was then 
used as a socks proxy to establish an RDP connection to the 
domain controller in the environment, login with harvested 
credentials, and then access sensitive documents. This 
bypassed the need to interact with the cloistered sensitive 
machine as the sensitive documents were stored in a heavily 
restricted shared folder within the domain controller itself. 
Even though the domain admin’s direct access to these files 
was not possible, after modifying the owner of the files and 
reconfiguring the access permissions, the sensitive 
documents were able to be exfiltrated.  
VI. DATA COLLECTION 
Data were collected on a Security Onion 16.04 [22] sensor 
that received traffic from a SPAN port on the virtual switch to 
which the entire enterprise was connected. 
A. Red Log 
 This file contains a record of the adversarial actions that 
took place within the environment. It includes the machines 
involved, targeted user (either the user account used to 
conduct an action or the user compromised from an action), 
and the action that occurred. The timestamps were recorded 
manually and may have variations between them but are 
accurate within 1 minute of the actual event.  
B. Zeek Logs 
 The Zeek logs [3] (formerly known as Bro logs) are from 
the July 19th 2019 to July 21st 2019. They contain a robust 
selection of log types used by the Zeek installation on Security 
Onion 16.04 and would be representative of what would be 
collected by Zeek sensors in most modern sensing 
environments. Zeek was configured to log in UTC and save 
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logs as JSON as is the current industry standard. The logs 
available are the following types: conn, dce_rpc, dhcp, dns, 
files, http, kerberos, known_hosts, known_servieces, ntlm, pe, 
smb_files, smb_mapping, software, ssl, weird, and x509. 
 Below is an example of a Zeek Kerberos log JSON object. 
{ 
  "ts": "2019-07-20T12:22:07.237641Z", 
  "uid": "CIKD7Hvs7PfUsMBHh", 
  "id.orig_h": "10.99.99.152", 
  "id.orig_p": 52081, 
  "id.resp_h": "10.99.99.5", 
  "id.resp_p": 88, 
  "request_type": "AS", 
  "client": "jdoe/G", 
  "service": "krbtgt/G.LAB", 
  "success": true, 
  "till": "2037-09-13T02:48:05.000000Z", 
  "cipher": "aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96", 
  "forwardable": true, 
  "renewable": true 
} 
 Here we can see the user jdoe sending a request to the 
Authentication Service (AS) for access to the Kerberos Ticket 
Granting Ticket (krbtgt). This is indicative of a user’s logon 
to a system. In this log we can see both the source and 
destination of the communication as well as the unencrypted 
details of the request. This logon is likely benign as we can 
see that this authentication event is originating as jdoe from 
jdoe’s main workstation. 
  
 The following is an example of a Zeek SSL JSON object 
that was generated via malicious C2 traffic. 
 
{ 
  "ts": "2019-07-20T18:05:52.328220Z", 
  "uid": "Csj4tz91kAqqEUNN8", 
  "id.orig_h": "10.99.99.152", 
  "id.orig_p": 53825, 
  "id.resp_h": "3.3.3.5", 
  "id.resp_p": 443, 
  "version": "TLSv10", 
  "cipher": "TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA", 
  "server_name": "icecream.inet", 
  "resumed": true, 
  "established": true, 
  "ja3": "6312930a139fa3ed22b87abb75c16afa", 
  "ja3s": "4192c0a946c5bd9b544b4656d9f624a4" 
} 
 
This entry by itself cannot be demonstrably identified as 
malicious; however, through its observation in contrast to 
other Zeek log entries it can be associated with anomalous 
behavior that can ultimately be linked to malicious events. 
This is examined in detail in section VII.  
 
Figure 3: Log Count Over Time 
Looking at the total amount of logs over time as shown in 
Figure 3, we can see that an initially high level of activity was 
followed by two days of normal circadian spikes. This is 
indicative of the scenario described above. Adversaries have 
historically identified the human lifecycles of the cyber 
defenders of a targeted network. They would then use this 
information to conduct decisive actions when staffing was at 
its lowest in order to increase their odds of success. This attack 
starting on a Friday afternoon (July 19th, 2019) and being 
executed throughout the weekend (July 20th-21st, 2019) fits 
this trend.
 
Figure 4: Log Types 
These logs have undergone sanitization to remove 
personally identifying information as well as remove 
references to unpublished works. This process affected 
approximately 0.2% of log entries, none of which were linked 
to adversary activity. Figure 4 presents the distribution of 
three log types.  
VII. TESTING 
The resulting dataset has been used to refine our ongoing 
research into the use of machine learning on graph data 
structures for cybersecurity applications. As mentioned in the 
introduction, a dataset was needed that was representative of 
the modern enterprise network, had labeled red team activity, 
but was also small enough to rapidly iterate prototype 
algorithms and applications. To that end, the PicoDomain 
dataset proved to be highly valuable. 
A. Event Verification 
This section will highlight the presence of the adversarial 
activity in the logs and demonstrate some potential analysis 
techniques. This analysis was done through a Jupyter 
notebook using the red team log and statistical analysis.  
 
Figure 5: SSL Activity by Domain 
When examining the SSL log activity in Figure 5 we can 
see a clear distinction between behavior before and during the 
adversary activity. On Friday July 19th we see a near even 
distribution of traffic between the sites on the simulated 
internet. After normal activity concluded on the 19th we see 
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the SSL activity subside, and then when activities resume on 
Saturday July 20th, there is a clear increase in the quantity of 
connections to the domain being used for C2. This type of 
behavior deviation could be used by analytics to detect 
compromised systems and/or malicious domains. 
 
Figure 6: New Kerberos Activity 
In Figure 6 we see the frequency of new Kerberose 
authentication events as extracted from the Zeek Kerberos 
logs. A new Kerberos authentication event is defined as the 
occurance of a unique bigram extracted from the Kerberos 
logs between either a source and destination IP or a Kerberos 
client and service. An established network should produce 
unique bigrams in relatively few situations, such as when a 
new user is made or when a user changes roles. In Figure 6 
we have overlayed the points in time where each account was 
compromised. With the exception of the initial compromise, 
there is tight correlation between compromised accounts and 
spikes of new Kerberos authentication activity. These 
Kerberos bigram events could be utilized to detect 
compromised accounts. 
 
Figure 7: SSL Activity to C2 Domain 
Another method for detection of the adversarial C2 traffic 
within the datset was to examine when each user’s primary 
work computer began to increase its communication to the 
C2 domain. In Figure 7 we again see a strong correlation 
between the time when each account was compromised and 
that user’s primary machine increasing the frequency with 
which it communicated to the C2 domain. This could be used 
in conjunction with the previous analytics to identifiy 
compromised users. 
 
Figure 8: SSL Activity to C2 Domain (Zoom-In) 
Focusing on the 2nd day of data, the most active day within 
the data as shown in Figure 8, SSL activity by user to the C2 
domain further demonstrates correlation between the 
compromise of user bduck and then shortly thereafter rmole 
and jsnake. It is also worth mentioning that this figure shows 
the adversarial communication that preceeded the 
compromise of new users in the blue spike of jdoe.  
B. Unsupervised Machine Learning 
To demonstrate that this dataset contains sufficient 
information for machine learning analysis, we utilized an off-
the-shelf anomaly detection algorithm from the sklearn 
Python library. Specifically, we implemented the Local 
Outlier Factor (LOF) originally proposed in the paper LOF: 
identifying density-based local outliers [23]. This is a 
relatively straight forward unsupervised anomaly detection 
algorithm based on identifying points with significantly 
different densities than their k-nearest neighbors. We 
extracted features from the Kerberos authentication logs via 
a 1-hot encoding of the client principal and service principal. 
Table 2 shows the anomalous authentication events as 
reported by the LOF technique. We can see that 10 out of the 
14 reported events are true positives while the remainder are 
false positives. Most of these events would not be detected by 
traditional signatures. Additionally, heuristic detection 
mechanisms that would detect them would need to be 
modified, likely manually, for each network they are applied 
to. For example, an office without specified work spaces 
would have a very different physical machine to user account 
mapping then a traditional office with assigned work spaces. 
A heuristic designed for the latter would produce voluminous 
false positives in the former.  This illustrates the strength of 
an unsupervised learning approach, and demonstrates the 
utility of the PicoDomain dataset for developing and 
prototyping such techniques. 
Table 2: Pico Domain Unsupervised ML Anomalies 
Auth from Auth to Notes 
jdoe rpcss/hr-win7-2 True Positive 
jdoe bduck True Positive 
rmole host/hr-win7-2 False Positive 
rmole protectedstorage/corp-dc.g.lab False Positive 
bduck hr-win7-2 False Positive 
bduck host/rnd-win10-2 True Positive 
bduck hr-win7-2 False Positive 
rnd-win10-2 gc/corp-dc True Positive 
rnd-win10-1 gc/corp-dc True Positive 
jdoe host/rnd-win10-2 True Positive 
jdoe host/rnd-win10-1 True Positive 
bduck host/rnd-win10-2 True Positive 
local.admin  krbtgt True Positive 
local.admin krbtgt True Positive 
C. Runtime Comparison 
To show how valuable the PicoDomain is in terms of its 
size and ease of use, we took the same off-the-shelf machine 
learning technique discussed previously, and this time 
applied it to an existing labeled cybesecurity dataset. We 
utilized the Los Alamos National Labs (LANL) 
Comprehensive Multi-source Cyber Security dataset [2]. This 
is one of the few datasets which contains network level 
events, and labeled red team activity. However, as mentioned 
previously, this dataset poses difficulties as it is highly 
anonymized, and highly verbose, making it a challenging 
dataset to develop algorithms on. Table 3 shows some metrics 
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for various stages of the algorithm pipeline. We can see that 
in all cases, the PicoDomain (half a million logs) is 
significantly less burdensome to utilize, with the entire 
algorithm pipeline completing in only a few seconds, and 
utilizing several kilobytes of memory, vs the LANL pipeline 
which takes over 2.5 hours, and 70 GB of memory. Although 
the LANL dataset is very useful for testing algorithms, its size 
(1.6 billion logs), especially sparsity of labels and 
anonymization, make it difficult to use for algorithm 
development and prototyping. In our research, we chose to 
first quickly iterate our algorithms in the PicoDomain dataset, 
followed by the evaluation on the LANL dataset. We believe 
such an approach can also be very beneficial to other 
researchers in this area.   
Table 3: Time and memory comparison PicoDomain vs. LANL 2015 
Metric LANL Pico 
Parsing raw logs into Pandas Dataframe time 1699 s 0.2 s 
Dataframe memory usage 70 GB 59 kB 
Data manipulation & feature extraction time 1834 s 1.3 s 
Local Outlier Factor anomaly detection time 6835 0.09 
VIII. FUTURE WORK  
This dataset met an immediate need for documented and 
representative data for experimentation but has several areas 
in which future work can enhance both its fidelity and its 
robustness. 
A. New C2 Platforms 
PowerShell Empire is, unfortunately, no longer being 
actively developed. It was an exceptional project, bringing 
together a comprehensive toolkit for almost every phase of an 
attack; however, the rise of awareness around PowerShell 
based attacks both in the IT sector as well as within Microsoft 
has diminished its usefulness since its initial release. At the 
same time, as PowerShell was losing its dominance as an 
adversary platform, researchers started experimenting with 
.NET based malware. Recently Ryan Cobb of Specter Ops 
release Covenant [24], a collaborative and extensible C2 
framework and platform based exclusively on .NET. As 
detection methodology for .NET malware is in its infancy, its 
use will likely follow the arc of PowerShell as an adversary 
tactic and remain relevant for the next several years. 
Several other C2 platforms, e.g., PoshC2 [25], FactionC2 
[26] and MerlinC2 [27], exist that decouple the management 
of communication and the employment of code on the target 
endpoints, focusing more closely on being a framework than 
an all-in-one solution. Utilizing one of these platforms with 
custom agent code would present a greater challenge for both 
traditional and Machine Learning based detection methods. 
B. Scope & Scale 
The enterprise presented in this scenario is very similar to 
something that would be found in a small business. Although 
the traffic captured qualitatively looks like something you 
would find in large networks the scale is not there. The 
limitation in scope for this endeavor was based on the need to 
prevent simulation tool artifacts from tainting the logs.  
Future work will consist of investigating the possibility of 
effective log cleansing or the use of hypervisors to automate 
user interaction.  The former being smaller in scope but the 
latter providing results that are forensically indistinguishable 
from an interactive user. Leveraging either technique would 
allow the simulated environment to be scaled up 
dramatically, likely only being limited by hardware availably.  
C. Host Logging 
This dataset was focused exclusively on network traffic 
and the industry standard logs that are generated from it. This 
was done due to the research it was supporting, but also from 
the likelihood of network data being available to security 
professionals in the event of an incident. Centralized host log 
collection of any efficacy is unlikely to be configured within 
a network not running a professionally installed Security 
Information Event Management (SIEM) system. If not 
configured prior to an incident, it is unlikely to be configured 
in the aftermath of an attack. The configuration of forwarding 
of logs puts a large burden on network operators and the 
volume of logs being forwarded may saturate network links.  
The network data, specifically Zeek, can be gathered by 
configuring SPAN ports or deploying TAPs. Both of these 
processes occur passively and do not affect network 
operations but for the moment a TAP is turned on. This makes 
the barrier to entry relatively low even for an understaffed 
network operations department. Additionally, the nature of 
collection allows incident responders to bring in their own 
equipment after an event and rapidly generate data.  
Despite the availability of network data, it misses large 
amounts of details in the event of a cyber-attack. For 
example, when deploying WMI event subscription 
persistence the network only saw the HTTPS connection. At 
this same time, if event logging was properly configured, one 
would see the minutia of the WMI event and even the 
encoded launcher. This would allow the user to rapidly 
decode the address of the C2 server and respond accordingly. 
This level of detail should be captured in future work. 
D. Improved Cycle Representation 
Certain log types exhibit no activity at night. This is an 
unfortunate area where the dataset does diverge from real-
world data. In a traditional office network, the amount of 
HTTP traffic at night is expected to be several times lower 
than during the day, perhaps as low as 1% of normal daily 
traffic, but not nonexistent. This nighttime traffic typically 
consists of updates, backups, and 24/7 system services. These 
are all things that do not rely on user interaction. After 
analyzing the logs it becomes apparent that these services are 
still active by the number of DNS queries during the nighttime 
hours, but these queries are for internet based services such as 
Windows Update. As these services were not deployed in the 
simulated environment the DNS queries do not resolve to 
reachable IP addresses. Future work would strive to correct 
this imbalance. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Existing network-level cyber security datasets are either 
lacking in ground truth, lacking in completeness, or not 
representative of real-world scenarios, rendering them 
insufficient for algorithm development and prototyping. In 
this work we generated the PicoDomain dataset to address 
these shortcomings. This dataset provides researchers with a 
compact, yet complete representation of an enterprise 
computer network, with an included and labeled complete 
attack campaign. This dataset is useful, as well as easy-to-
use, for not only simple statistical analysis, but also more 
complex machine learning tasks. 
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